We present an algorithm to compute the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs as the discount factor tends to 1 for stochastic games with observable states and public (but not necessarily perfect) monitoring when the limiting set of (long-run players') equilibrium payoffs is independent of the initial state. This is the case, for instance, if the Markov chain induced by any Markov strategy profile is irreducible. We then provide conditions under which a folk theorem obtains: if in each state the joint distribution over the public signal and next period's state satisfies some rank condition, every feasible payoff vector above the minmax payoff is sustained by a perfect public equilibrium with low discounting.
1. INTRODUCTION DYNAMIC GAMES ARE DIFFICULT TO SOLVE. In repeated games, finding some equilibrium is easy, as any repetition of a stage-game Nash equilibrium will do. This is not the case in stochastic games. The characterization of even the most "elementary" equilibria for such games, namely (stationary) Markov equilibria, in which continuation strategies depend on the current state only, turns out to be often challenging. Further complications arise once the assumption of perfect monitoring is abandoned. In that case, our understanding of equilibria in repeated games owes an invaluable debt to Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) , whose recursive techniques have found numerous applications. Similar ideas have been developed in stochastic games by Parthasarathy (1987, 1991) to establish the most general equilibrium existence results to date (see also Solan (1998) ). Those ideas have triggered a development of numerical methods (Judd, Yeltekin, and Conklin (2003) ), whose use is critical for applications in which postulating a high discount factor appears too restrictive.
In repeated games, more tractable characterizations have been achieved in the case of low discounting. Fudenberg and Levine (1994, hereafter FL) and Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994, hereafter FLM) showed that the set of (perfect public) equilibrium payoffs can be characterized by a family of static constrained optimization programs. Based on this and other insights, they de-1 This paper is the result of a merger between two independent projects: Hörner and Vieille developed the algorithm, and Sugaya and Takahashi established the folk theorem by a direct argument. We thank Katsuhiko Aiba, Eduardo Faingold, Drew Fudenberg, Yingni Guo, Tristan Tomala, and Yuichi Yamamoto for helpful discussions. J. Hörner gratefully acknowledges financial support from NSF Grant SES 092098. N. Vieille gratefully acknowledges financial support from Fondation HEC.
rived sufficient conditions for a folk theorem for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. The algorithm developed by FL has proved to be useful, as it allows identification of the equilibrium payoff set in interesting cases in which the sufficient conditions for the folk theorem fail. This is the case, for instance, in the partnership game of Radner, Myerson, and Maskin (1986) . More importantly, FL's algorithm can accommodate both long-run and shortrun players, which is essential for many applications, especially in macroeconomics and political economy, in which consumers or voters are often modeled as nonstrategic (see Mailath and Samuelson (2006, Chaps. 5 and 6) ).
This paper extends these results to stochastic games. More precisely, it provides an algorithm that characterizes the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games with finitely many states, signals, and actions, in which states are observed and monitoring is imperfect but public, under the assumption that the limiting set of equilibrium payoffs (of the long-run players) is independent of the initial state. This assumption is satisfied, in particular, if the Markov chain over states defined by any Markov strategy profile is irreducible. This algorithm is a natural extension of FL and indeed reduces to it if there is only one state. The key to this characterization lies in the linear constraints to impose on continuation payoffs. In FL, each optimization program is indexed by a direction λ ∈ R I that specifies the weights on the payoffs in the objective of the I players. Trivially, the boundary point v of the equilibrium payoff set that maximizes this weighted average in the direction λ is such that, for any realized signal y, the continuation payoff w(y) must satisfy the property that λ · (w(y) − v) ≤ 0. Indeed, one of the main insights of FL is that once discounting is sufficiently low, attention can be restricted to this linear constraint for each λ so that the program itself becomes linear in w and, hence, considerably more tractable. In a stochastic game, it is clear that the continuation payoff must be indexed not only by the public signal, but also by the realized state, and since the stage games that correspond to the current and to the next state need not be the same, there is little reason to expect this property to be preserved for each pair of states. Indeed, it is not. One might then wonder whether the resulting problem admits a linear characterization at all. The answer is affirmative.
When all players are long-run, this characterization can be used to establish a folk theorem under assumptions that parallel those invoked by FLM. In stochastic games, note that state transitions might be affected by actions taken, so that, because states are observed, they already provide information about players' past actions. Therefore, it is natural to impose rank conditions at each state on how actions affect the joint distribution over the future state and signal. This is weaker than requiring such conditions on signals alone and, indeed, it is easy to construct examples where the folk theorem holds without any public signals.
This folk theorem also generalizes Dutta's (1995) folk theorem for stochastic games with perfect monitoring. Unlike ours, Dutta's ingenious proof is constructive, extending ideas developed by Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) for the case of repeated games with perfect monitoring. However, his assumptions (except for the monitoring structure) are the same as ours. In independent and simultaneous work, Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2010) provided a different, direct proof of the folk theorem for stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring under irreducibility, without a general characterization of the equilibrium payoff set. Their rank assumptions are stronger, as discussed in Section 5.
Finally, our results also imply the average cost optimality equation from dynamic programming, which obtains here as a special case of a single player. The average cost optimality equation is widely used in operations research, for instance, in routing, inventory, scheduling, and queueing problems, and our results might thus prove useful for game-theoretic extensions of such problems, as in inventory or queueing games.
Of course, stochastic games are also widely used in economics. They play an important role in industrial organization (among many others, see Ericson and Pakes (1995) ). It is hoped that methods such as ours might help provide integrated analyses of questions whose treatment had to be confined to simple environments so far, such as the role of imperfect monitoring (Green and Porter (1984) ) and of business cycles (Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) ) in collusion. Rigidities and persistence play an important role in macroeconomics as well, giving rise to stochastic games. See Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) , for example. In Section 6, we apply our results to a simple political economy game and establish a version of the folk theorem when some players are short-run.
NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS
We introduce stochastic games with public signals. At each stage, the game is in one state and players simultaneously choose actions. Nature then determines the current reward (or flow payoff) profile, the next state, and a public signal as a function of the current state and the action profile. The sets S of possible states, I of players, A i of actions available to player i, and Y of public signals are assumed finite.
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Given an action profile a ∈ A := × i A i and a state s ∈ S, we denote by r(s a) ∈ R I the reward profile in state s given a, and denote by p(t y|s a) the joint probability of moving to state t ∈ S and of receiving the public signal y ∈ Y . (As usual, we can think of r i (s a) as the expectation given a of some realized reward that is a function of a private outcome of player i and the public signal only.)
We assume that at the end of each period, the only information publicly available to all players consists of nature's choices: the next state together with the public signal. When properly interpreting Y , this includes the case of perfect monitoring and the case of publicly observed rewards. Note, however, that this fails to include the case where actions are perfectly monitored, yet states are not disclosed. In such a case, the natural "state" variable is the (common) posterior belief of the players on the underlying state.
Thus, in the stochastic game, in each period n = 1 2 , the state is observed, the stage game is played, and the corresponding public signal is then revealed. The stochastic game is parameterized by the initial state s 1 , and it will be useful to consider all potential initial states simultaneously. The public history at the beginning of period n is then h n = (s 1 y 1 s n−1 y n−1 s n ). We set H 1 := S, the set of initial states. The set of public histories at the beginning of period n is therefore H n := (S × Y ) n−1 × S. We let H := n≥1 H n denote the set of all public histories. The private history for player i at the beginning of period n is a sequence h i n = (s 1 a i 1 y 1 s n−1 a i n−1 y n−1 s n ), and we similarly define
Given a stage n ≥ 1, we denote by s n the state, by a n the realized action profile, and by y n the public signal in period n. We often use the same notation to denote both these realizations and the corresponding random variables.
A (behavior) strategy for player i ∈ I is a map σ i :
. Every pair of initial state s 1 and strategy profile σ generates a probability distribution over histories in the obvious way and thus also generates a distribution over sequences of the players' rewards. Players seek to maximize their payoffs, that is, average discounted sums of their rewards, using a common discount factor δ < 1. Thus, the payoff of player i ∈ I if the initial state is s 1 and the players follow the strategy profile σ is defined as
We consider a special class of equilibria. A strategy σ i is public if it depends on the public history only and not on the private information. That is, a public strategy is a mapping σ i : H → Δ(A i ). A perfect public equilibrium (hereafter, PPE) is a profile of public strategies such that, given any period n and public history h n , the strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium from that period on. Note that this class of equilibria includes Markov equilibria, in which strategies only depend on the current state and period. In what follows though, a Markov strategy for player i will be a public strategy that is a function of states only, that is, a function S → Δ(A i ).
3 For each Markov strategy profile α = (α s ) s∈S ∈ ( × i∈I Δ(A i )) S , we denote by q α (t|s) := p(t × Y |s α s ) the transition probabilities of the Markov chain over S induced by α.
Note that the set of PPE payoffs is a function of the current state only, and does not otherwise depend on the public history or on the period. Perfect public equilibria are sequential equilibria, but it is easy to construct examples that show that the converse is not generally true. What we characterize, therefore, is a subset of the sequential equilibrium payoffs.
We denote by E δ (s) ⊂ R I the (compact) set of PPE payoffs of the game with initial state s ∈ S and discount factor δ < 1. All statements about convergence of or equality between sets are understood in the sense of the Hausdorff distance d(A B) between sets A and B.
Because both state and action sets are finite, it follows from Fink (1964) and Takahashi (1962) that a (perfect public) equilibrium always exists in this setup.
Our main result does not apply to all finite stochastic games. Some examples of stochastic games, in particular those involving absorbing states, exhibit remarkably complex asymptotic properties. See, for instance, Bewley and Kohlberg (1976) or Sorin (1986) . We shall come back to the implications of our results for such games. Our main theorem makes use of the following assumption.
ASSUMPTION A: The limit set of PPE payoffs is independent of the initial state: for all s t ∈ S,
This is an assumption on endogenous variables. A stronger assumption on exogenous variables that implies Assumption A is irreducibility: For any (pure) Markov strategy profile a = (a s ) ∈ A S , the induced Markov chain over S with transition function q a is irreducible. Actually, it is not necessary that every Markov strategy gives rise to an irreducible Markov chain. It is clearly sufficient if there is some state that is accessible from every other state regardless of the Markov strategy.
Another class of games that satisfy Assumption A, although they do not satisfy irreducibility, is the class of alternating-move games (see Lagunoff and Matsui (1997) and Yoon (2001) ). With two players, for instance, such a game can be modeled as a stochastic game in which the state space is A 1 ∪ A 2 , where a i ∈ A i is the state that corresponds to the last action played by player i, when it is player −i's turn to move. (Note that this implies perfect monitoring by definition, as states are observed.)
Note also that by redefining the state space to be S × Y , one may further assume that only states are disclosed. That is, the class of stochastic games with public signals is no more general than the class of stochastic games in which only the current state is publicly observed. However, the Markov chain over S × Y with transition functionq a (t z|s y) := p(t z|s a s ) need not be irreducible even if q a (t|s) is.
AN ALGORITHM TO COMPUTE EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS

Preliminaries: Repeated Games
As our results generalize the algorithm of FL, it is useful to start with a reminder of their results and to examine, within a specific example, what difficulties a generalization to stochastic games raises.
Recall that the set of (perfect public) equilibrium payoffs must be a fixed point of the Bellman-Shapley operator (see Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) ). Define the one-shot game Γ δ (w), where w : Y → R I , with action sets A i and payoff function (1 − δ)r(a) + δ y∈Y p(y|a)w(y). Note that if v is an equilibrium payoff vector of the repeated game, associated with action profile α ∈ × i∈I Δ(A i ) and continuation payoff vectors w(y), as a function of the initial signal, then α must be a Nash equilibrium of Γ δ (w) with payoff v:
Conversely, if we are given a function w such that w(y) ∈ E δ for all y and a Nash equilibrium α of Γ δ (w) with payoff v, then we can construct an equilibrium of the repeated game with payoff v in which the action profile α is played in the initial period.
Therefore, the analysis of the repeated game can be reduced to that of the one-shot game. The constraint that the continuation payoff lies in the (unknown) set E δ complicates the analysis significantly. FL's key observation is that this constraint can be replaced by linear constraints for the sake of asymptotic analysis (as δ → 1). If α is a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game Γ δ (w) with payoff v ∈ E δ , then by subtracting δv on both sides of (1) and dividing through by 1 − δ, we obtain
where, for all y,
Thus, provided that the equilibrium payoff set is convex, the payoff v is also in E˜δ for allδ > δ, because we can use as continuation payoff vectorsw(y) the rescaled vectors w(y) (see Figure 1) . Conversely, provided that the normal vector to the boundary of E δ varies continuously with the boundary point, then any set of payoff vectors w(y) that lie in one of the half-spaces defined by this normal vector (i.e., such that λ · (w(y) − v) ≤ 0 or, equivalently, λ · x(y) ≤ 0) must also lie in E δ for discount factors close enough to 1. In particular, if we seek to identify the payoff v that maximizes λ · v on E δ for δ close enough to 1, given λ ∈ R I , it suffices to compute the score
such that α is a Nash equilibrium with payoff v of the game Γ (x) whose payoff function is given by r(a) + y∈Y p(y|a)x(y), and subject to the linear constraints λ · x(y) ≤ 0 for all y. Note that the discount factor no longer appears in this program. We thus obtain a half-space H(λ) := {v ∈ R I : λ · v ≤ k(λ)} that contains E δ for every δ.
This must be true for all vectors λ ∈ R I . Let H := λ∈R I H(λ). It follows, under an appropriate dimensionality assumption, that the equilibrium payoff set can be obtained as the intersection of these half-spaces (see FL, Theorem 3.1):
A Stochastic Game
Our purpose is to come up with an algorithm for stochastic games that would generalize FL's algorithm. To do so, we must determine the appropriate constraints on continuation payoffs. Let us attempt to adapt FL's arguments to a specific example. EXAMPLE 1: There are two states, i = 1 2, and two players. Each player only takes an action in his own state: player i chooses L or R in state i. Actions are not observable, but do affect transitions, so that players learn about their opponents' actions via the evolution of the state. If action L (R) is taken in state i, then the next state is again i with probability p L (p R ). Let us pick here p L = 1 − p R = 1/10. Rewards are given in Figure 2 (transition probabilities to states 1 and 2, respectively, are given in parentheses).
Player i has a higher reward in state j = i, independently of the action. Moreover, by playing L, which yields him the higher reward in his own state, he maximizes the probability to switch states. Thus, playing the efficient action R requires intertemporal incentives, which are hard to provide absent public signals. Constructing an equilibrium in which L is not always played appears challenging, but not impossible: playing R in state i if and only if the state was j = i in the previous two periods (or since the beginning of the game if fewer periods have elapsed) is an equilibrium for some high discount factor (δ ≈ 0 823). So there exist equilibrium payoffs above 1.
In analogy with (1), we may now decompose the payoff vector in state s = 1 2 as
where t is the next state, w t (s) is the continuation payoff then, and p(t|s α s ) is the probability of transiting from s to t given action α s at state s. Fix λ ∈ R I . If v s maximizes the score λ · v s in all states s = 1 2, then the continuation payoff in state t gives a lower score than v t , independently of the initial state: for all s t,
Our goal is to eliminate the discount factor. Note, however, that if we subtract δv s on both sides of (2) and divide by 1 − δ, we obtain
and there is no reason to expect λ · (w t (s) − v s ) to be negative unless s = t (compare with (3)). Unlike the limiting set of feasible payoffs as δ → 1, the set of feasible rewards does depend on the state (in state 1, it is the segment [(1 1) (0 3)]; in state 2, the segment [(1 1) (3 0)]; see the right panel of Figure 2) , and so the score λ · w t (s) in state t might exceed the maximum score achieved by v s in state s. Thus, defining x by
we know that λ · x s (s) ≤ 0 for all s, but not the sign of λ · x t (s), t = s. On the one hand, we cannot restrict it to be negative: if λ · x 2 (1) ≤ 0, then because also λ · x 1 (1) ≤ 0, by considering λ = (1 0), player 1's payoff starting from state 1 cannot exceed his highest reward in that state (i.e., 1). Yet we know that some equilibria yield strictly higher payoffs. On the other hand, if we impose no restrictions on x t (s), s = t, then we can set v s as high as we wish in (4) by picking x t (s) large enough. The value of the program to be defined would be unbounded. What is the missing constraint?
We do know that (3) holds for all pairs (s t). By adding up these inequalities for (s t) = (1 2) and (2 1), we obtain
Equation (5) has a natural interpretation in terms of s-blocks, as defined in the literature on Markov chains (see, for instance, Nummelin (1984) ). When the Markov chain (induced by the players' strategies) is communicating, as it is in our example, we might divide the game into the subpaths of the chain between consecutive visits to a given state s. The score achieved by the continuation payoff once state s is revisited on the subpath (s 1 s k ) (where s 1 = s k = s) cannot exceed the score achieved by v s , and so the difference in these scores, as measured by the sum λ · k−1 j=1 x s j+1 (s j ), must be negative. Note that the irreducibility assumption also guarantees that the limit set of feasible payoffs F (as δ → 1) is independent of the initial state, as shown in the right panel of Figure 2 . 4 To conclude, we obtain the program
2 , {x t (s) ∈ R 2 : s t = 1 2}, and α = (α s ) s=1 2 such that, in each state s, α s is a Nash equilibrium with payoff v of the game whose payoff function is given by r(s a s ) + t p(t|s a s )x t (s), and such that λ · x 1 (1) ≤ 0, λ · x 2 (2) ≤ 0, and λ · (x 1 (2) + x 2 (1)) ≤ 0. Note that this program already factors in our assumption that equilibrium payoffs can be taken to be independent of the state.
It follows from Theorem 1 in the next section that this is the right program. Perhaps it is a little surprising that the constraints involve unweighted sums of vectors x t (s), rather than, say, sums that are weighted by the invariant measure under the equilibrium strategy. Lemma 1 below provides a link between the constraints and such sums. What should come as no surprise, though, is that generalizing these constraints to more than two states involves considering all cycles, or permutations, over states (see Constraint 2(ii) below).
The Characterization
Given a state s ∈ S and a map x : S × Y → R S×I , we denote by Γ (s x) the one-shot game with action sets A i and payoff function r(s a s ) + t∈S y∈Y p(t y|s a s )x t (s y) where x t (s y) ∈ R I is the tth component of x(s y). Given λ ∈ R I , we denote by P(λ) the maximization program
where the supremum is taken over all v ∈ R I , x : S × Y → R S×I , and α = (α s ) ∈ ( × i∈I Δ(A i )) S such that the following constraints hold:
CONSTRAINT 1: For each s, α s is a Nash equilibrium with payoff v of the game Γ (s x).
CONSTRAINT 2: For each T ⊆ S, for each permutation φ : T → T and each
Denote by k(λ) ∈ [−∞ +∞] the value of P(λ). We will prove that the feasible set of P(λ) is non-empty, so that k(λ) > −∞ (Proposition 1), and that the value of P(λ) is finite, so that k(λ) < +∞ (Section 3.4).
It is also useful to introduce the program P(λ α) parameterized by α, where the supremum is taken over all v and x, with α fixed. Let k(λ α) denote the value of P(λ α). Observe that P(λ α) is a linear program and that k(λ) = sup α k(λ α).
We define H(λ) := {v ∈ R I : λ · v ≤ k(λ)} and set H := λ∈R I H(λ). Note that H is convex. Let S 1 denote the set of λ ∈ R I of norm 1. 6 Observe that
, and c > 0. Hence H is also equal to λ∈S 1 H(λ).
Our main result is a generalization of FL's algorithm to compute the limit set of payoffs as δ → 1.
Note that with one state only, our optimization program reduces to the algorithm of FL. The proof of Theorem 1 is organized into two propositions, stated below and proved in the Appendix. Note that these propositions do not rely on Assumption A.
PROPOSITION 1: For every δ < 1, we have the following conditions:
We note that it need not be the case that H ⊇ E δ (s) for each s ∈ S.
PROPOSITION 2:
Assume that H has nonempty interior and let Z be any compact set contained in the interior of H. Then Z ⊆ E δ (s) for every s ∈ S and δ large enough.
The logic of the proof of Proposition 2 is inspired by FL and FLM, but differs in important respects. We here give a short and overly simplified account of the proof, which nevertheless contains some basic insights.
Let a payoff vector v ∈ Z and a direction λ ∈ S 1 be given. Since v is interior to H, we have λ · v < k(λ), and there thus exists x = (x t (s y)) such that v is a Nash equilibrium payoff of the one-shot game Γ (s x) and all inequality constraints on x hold with strict inequalities.
For high δ, we use x to construct equilibrium continuation payoffs w adapted to v in the discounted game, with the interpretation that x t (s y) is the normalized (continuation) payoff increment, should (t y) occur. Since we have no control over the sign of λ · x t (s y), the one-period argument that is familiar from repeated games does not extend to stochastic games. To overcome this issue, we instead rely on large blocks of stages of fixed size. Over such a block, and thanks to the inequalities Constraint 2 satisfied by x, we prove that the sum of payoff increments is negative. This in turn ensures that the continuation payoff at the end of the block is below v in the direction λ.
Since H is convex, it follows from these two propositions that
This statement applies to all finite stochastic games with observable states and full-dimensional H, whether they satisfy Assumption A or not. Theorem 1 then follows, given Assumption A.
Finiteness of P(λ)
It is instructive, and useful for the sequel, to understand why the value of P(λ) is finite for each possible choice of λ. To see this, we rely on the next lemma, which we also use in other places. In words, for any payoff increments (x t (s)), the expectation of these increments (with respect to the invariant measure) is equal to some fixed conical combination of their sums over cycles. This provides a link between Constraints 1 and 2.
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: We exploit an explicit formula for μ. Given a state s ∈ R, an s-graph is a directed graph g with vertex set R and the following two properties:
• Any state t = s has outdegree 1, while s has outdegree 0.
• The graph g has no cycle. Equivalently, for any t = s, there is a unique longest path starting from t, and this path ends in s. We identify such a graph with its set of edges. The weight of any such graph g is defined to be q(g) := (t u)∈g q(u|t). Let G(s) denote the set of s-graphs. Then the invariant measure is given by
(see, e.g., Freidlin and Wentzell (1991) ).
Thus, we have
Observe that for each (s g t) ∈ Ω, the graph g ∪ {(s → t)} has exactly one cycle (which contains s → t) and all vertices of R have outdegree 1. Let C ⊆ Ω be any equivalence class for ∼. Let s 1 → s 2 → · · · → s k = s 1 denote the unique, common cycle of all (s g t) ∈ C. Define T := {s 1 s k−1 } and denote by φ : T → T the map that associates to any state u ∈ T its successor in the cycle.
Observe that the product q(g)q(t|s) is independent of (s g t) ∈ C; we denote it ρ C T φ . It is then readily checked that
The result follows by summation over equivalence classes.
Q.E.D.
This lemma readily implies that the value of P(λ) is finite for each direction λ. Indeed, let a direction λ ∈ R I and a feasible point (v x α) in P(λ) be given, and recall that q α is the transition function of the Markov chain induced by α. Let R ⊆ S be an arbitrary recurrent set for this Markov chain and denote by μ ∈ Δ(R) the invariant measure over R. For each s t ∈ R, let f (s t) be a signal y that maximizes λ · x t (s y). Then Lemma 1 implies that
It thus follows that
for every invariant (probability) measure of the Markov chain induced by α.
CONNECTION TO KNOWN RESULTS
Our characterization includes as special cases the characterization obtained by FL for repeated games, as well as the average cost optimality equation from dynamic programming in the case of one player. In this section, we explain these connections in more detail.
Another Generalization of FL's Algorithm
The specific form of the optimization program P(λ) is intriguing and calls for some discussion. We here elaborate upon Section 3.2. Perhaps a natural generalization of FL's algorithm to the setup of stochastic games would have been the following. Given a direction λ ∈ S 1 , for each initial state s ∈ S, consider the highest PPE payoff v s ∈ R I in the direction λ, when starting from s. Again, for each initial state s, there are a mixed action profile α s and continuation PPE payoffs w t (s y) to be interpreted as continuation payoffs in the event that the signal is y and the next state is t, and such that the following statements hold:
(a) For each s, α s is a Nash equilibrium with payoff v s of the game with payoff function (1 − δ)r(s a s ) + δ t y p(t y|s a s )w t (s y).
(b) For any two states s t ∈ S and any signal y ∈ Y , λ · w t (s y) ≤ λ · v t . Mimicking FL's approach, we introduce the program, denotedP(λ δ), sup (vs) w α min s λ · v s , where the supremum is taken over all ((v s ) w α) such that (a) and (b) hold. 7 As we discussed in Section 3.2 and unlike in the repeated game framework, the value ofP(λ δ) does depend on δ. The reason is that when setting x t (s y) = δ 1−δ (w t (s y) − v s ), the inequality λ · x t (s y) ≤ 0 need not hold (note that x t (s y) involves w t (s y) and v s , while (b) involves w t (s y) and v t ).
To obtain a program that does not depend on δ, we relax the program P(λ δ) as follows. Observe that for any sequence s 1 s k of states such that s k = s 1 and for each y j ∈ Y (1 ≤ j < k), we have
where the second equality holds since s 1 = s k and the final inequality holds by (b). These are precisely the averaging constraints which appear in our linear program P(λ). That is, the program P(λ) appears as a discount-independent relaxation of the programP(λ δ). 8 This immediately raises the issue of whether this is a "meaningful" relaxation of the program. We here wish to suggest that this is the case, by arguing that the two programs P(λ) andP(λ δ) have asymptotically the same value, as δ → 1. To show this claim, we start with a feasible point (v x α) in P(λ) and construct a feasible point ((v s ) w α) iñ P(λ δ) such that the norm of v s − v is on the order of 1 − δ for each s ∈ S.
To keep the discussion straightforward, we assume that state transitions are independent of actions and signals: p(t y|s a) = q(t|s) × π(y|s a).
9 Set firstw t (s y) := v + 1−δ δ x t (s y). Note that for each state s ∈ S, α s is a Nash equilibrium with payoff v of the one-shot game with payoff function (1 − δ)r(s a s ) + δ t y p(t y|s a s )w t (s y). The desired continuation payoff vector w is obtained by adding an action-independent vector tow. That is, we set w t (s y) :=w t (s y) + C t (s) for some vectors C t (s) ∈ R I . For each choice of (C t (s)), the profile α s is still a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game when continuation payoffs are given by w instead ofw, and it yields a payoff of
We thus need to check that there exist vectors C t (s) with norms on the order of 1 − δ such that the inequalities λ · w t (s y) ≤ λ · v t hold for all (s t y). Setting c t (s) := λ · C t (s), basic algebra shows that the latter inequalities are satisfied as soon as the inequalities
hold for all pairs (s t) of states, where l t (s) := min y∈Y λ · (v −w t (s y)). We are left to show that such values of c t (s) can be found.
Feasibility of (v x α) in P(λ) implies that s∈T l φ(s) (s) ≥ 0 for every T ⊆ S and every permutation φ over T (this is a simple rewriting of Constraint 2). As shown in Appendix A.5 (see Claim 3), this implies that there exists a vector
for every s t ∈ S, and s∈T l * φ(s) (s) = 0 for every T ⊆ S and every permutation φ over T . Given δ < 1 and t ∈ S, we denote by μ δ t ∈ Δ(S) the δ-discounted occupation measure of the Markov chain with initial state t. That is, μ δ t (s) is the expected discounted frequency of visits to state s when starting from state t. Formally,
where P t (s n = s) is, the probability, that the Markov chain visits state s in stage n.
Elementary algebra then shows that the vector c t (
for each s t, and is, therefore, a solution to (S).
10
We conclude by arguing briefly that the norm of C t (s) is on the order of 1−δ, as desired. Because l t (s) = min y∈Y λ · (v −w t (s y)) = − 1−δ δ max y∈Y λ · x t (s y), l t (s) is on the order of 1 − δ. It follows from the proof of Claim 3 that l * is a solution for a linear program whose constraints are linear in l = (l t (s)). Thus l * and c t (s) = E μ δ t [l * s (s)] are also on the order of 1 − δ. It then suffices to choose C t (s) on the order of 1 − δ such that λ · C t (s) = c t (s).
Dynamic Programming
It is sometimes argued that the results of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) can be viewed as generalizations of dynamic programming to the case of multiple players. In the absence of any payoff-relevant state variable, this claim is difficult to appreciate within the context of repeated games. By focusing on one-player games, we show that, indeed, our characterization reduces to the optimality equation of dynamic programming. We here assume irreducibility. Irreducibility implies Assumption A, which in turn implies that the set of limit points of the family {v δ (s)} δ<1 as δ → 1 is independent of s, where v δ (s) is the value of the Markov decision process with initial state s. This statement is the so-called average cost optimality equation. See Hoffman and Karp (1966) , Sennott (1999) , or Kallenberg (2002) . To get some intuition for this corollary, note first that with one player, signals become irrelevant and we might ignore them. Consider then the direction λ = 1. To maximize the player's payoff, we should increase the values of x t (s) as much as possible. So conjecture for a moment that all the Constraints 2 bind: for all T ⊆ S and permutations φ : T → T , s∈T x φ(s) (s) = 0. Let us then set x * t := x t (s), for some fixed states ∈ S. Note that for all s t ∈ S,
where the first two equalities use the binding constraints. Because a s is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ (s x) with payoff v * , we have
s gives the desired result. The proof below verifies the conjecture and supplies missing steps.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1: By Proposition 1(i), the common set of limit points of {v δ (s)} δ<1 is a subset of H, so that H = ∅. We first argue that H is a singleton.
The set H is uniquely characterized by the two values k(λ), λ ∈ {−1 +1}. Since H = ∅, we have k(+1) ≥ −k(−1).
Note now that any pair (v x) that is feasible in P(λ α) is also feasible in P(λ a), for any a ∈ A S such that α s (a s ) > 0 for each s. Consequently, we need only look at pure Markov strategies so as to compute k(+1) and k(−1).
Let a = (a s ) ∈ A S be any pure Markov strategy which induces an irreducible Markov chain over S with invariant measure μ. Let (v + x + ) be a feasible pair in P(+1 a) and let (v − x − ) be a feasible pair in P(−1 a). By Lemma 1, we have
and H is a singleton. This implies, in particular, that v * := lim δ→1 v δ (s) exists for each s ∈ S.
We use the following claim.
CLAIM 1: If a vector (x t (s)) ∈ R S×S satisfies s∈T x φ(s) (s) = 0 for all T ⊆ S and all permutations φ : T → T , and
for some a = (a s ) ∈ A S and all s ∈ S, then the inequality (7) holds with equality for each s.
PROOF: Assume to the contrary that the inequality (7) is strict for somē s ∈ S. Let μ ∈ Δ(S) be the invariant measure of the Markov chain induced by a over S. By Lemma 1,
But this implies that, for all δ high enough, the δ-discounted payoff induced by a exceeds v δ (s), which is a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
Pick a * ∈ A S and (x t (s y)) such that (v * x) is feasible in P(+1 a * ). Pick a vector x * = (x * t (s)) ∈ R S×S such that x * t (s) ≥ x t (s y) for all s t ∈ S and y ∈ Y , and s∈T x * φ(s) (s) = 0 for all (T φ).
11 We claim that, for each s ∈ S, we have Thus, the left-hand side in (8) does not exceed the right-hand side. Let now a state s ∈ S and an action profile a s ∈ A be given that satisfy the inequality
Then, by Claim 1 applied to a := (a * −s a s ), (9) holds with equality. This proves that (8) holds for each s ∈ S.
Since s∈T x * φ(s) (s) = 0 for all (T φ), there is a vector x * ∈ R S such that
Uniqueness of v * follows at once. Assume indeed that (6) holds for some (v x). For each s ∈ S, let a s be an action that maximizes the right-hand side of (6) and let a := (a s ). Setx t (s y) := x t − x s for each s t ∈ S and y ∈ Y . Then (v x a) is feasible in P(+1) and in P(−1) as well. Hence,
Interpretation of the Variables x t (s y)
The variables x t (s y) are not continuation payoffs per se. Rather, they are payoff differences that account for both the signal and the possible change of states. In the case of a repeated game, they reduce to a variable of the signal alone (in the notation of FL, they are then equal to δ 1−δ (w(y) − v)). This variable reflects how the continuation payoff adjusts from the current to the following period to provide the appropriate incentives as a function of the realized signal. In the case of dynamic programming, these variables collapse to a function x t (s). This is the relative value function, as it is known in stochastic dynamic programming, and it captures the value of the Markov decision process in state t relative to state s. It can be further decomposed into a difference x * t − x * s for some function x * that only depends on the current state. While there is no reason to expect the system of inequalities Constraint 2 to simplify in general, there are some special cases in which it does. For instance, given our discussion above, we might suspect that the payoff adjustments required by the provision of incentives, on one hand, and by the state transitions, on the other, can be disentangled whenever transitions are uninformative about actions, conditional on the signals. Indeed, both in the case of action-independent transitions (studied in Section 7) and in the case of perfect monitoring, we can show that these variables can be separated asx t (s) +x(s y) for some functionx that only depends on the current and the next states, and some functionx that only depends on the current state and the realized signal.
THE FOLK THEOREM
FLM established a folk theorem for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring when the signal distribution satisfies some rank condition. In this section, we extend their folk theorem to stochastic games. We derive our folk theorem by investigating the programs P(λ) under a similar rank condition and relating scores k(λ) to feasible sets and to minmax payoffs.
We do not rely on Assumption A in this section. Rather, it is more convenient to impose state independence on limiting feasible sets and minmax values when necessary.
Let F δ (s) be the convex hull of the set of feasible payoffs of the game with initial state s ∈ S and discount factor δ < 1. The set F δ (s) is compact and converges to F(s) as δ → 1, where F(s) is the set of limit-average feasible payoffs with initial state s (see, for instance, Dutta (1995, Lemma 2)). Let also m i δ (s) be player i's minmax payoff in the game with initial state s and discount factor δ, defined as
where the minimum and the maximum are taken over public strategies σ −i and σ i , respectively. As δ → 1, m i δ (s) converges to m i (s), where m i (s) is player i's limit-average minmax payoff with initial state s (see Mertens and Neyman (1981) and Neyman (2003) ).
Define the intersection of the sets of feasible and individually rational payoffs:
For a given state s ∈ S and an action profile α −i = (α j ) j =i , let Π i (s α −i ) be the |A i | × |S × Y | matrix whose (a i (t y))th component is given by p(t y|s a i α −i ). For s ∈ S and α = (α i ), we stack two matrices vertically: If p L = p R , then incentives cannot be provided for players to play R, so that the unique PPE payoff is (1 1).
With the above assumptions, we characterize k(λ) in terms of feasible sets and minmax payoffs. Let e i denote the ith coordinate basis vector in R I .
LEMMA 2: Under Assumptions F1 and F2, we have the following situations:
While this lemma characterizes the value of the optimization program for each direction λ under Assumptions F1 and F2, the algorithm can be adapted to the purpose of computing feasible sets and minmax payoffs (in public strategies) without these assumptions. In the first case, it suffices to ignore the incentive Constraint 1 in the program P(λ) and to take the intersection of the resulting half-spaces. In the second case, it suffices to focus on the incentives of the minmaxed player i and to take as a direction λ the coordinate vector −e i . The proofs follow similar lines; details are available from the authors.
Combined with Proposition 2, Lemma 2 implies the following folk theorem, which extends both the folk theorem for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring by FLM and the folk theorem for stochastic games with observable actions by Dutta (1995) .
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12 When the set of available actions depends on the state, as in Example 1, the definitions of full rank must be adjusted in the obvious way. Namely, we say that α has individual full rank for player i at state s if the rank of Π i (s α −i ) is no less than the number of actions available to player i at state s. A similar modification applies to pairwise full rank.
13 Note that Dutta (1995, Theorem 9. 3) showed that full dimensionality can be weakened to payoff asymmetry if mixed strategies are observable, an assumption that makes little sense under imperfect monitoring. It is known that under irreducibility, F(s) and m i (s) are independent of state s. In Example 1 in Section 3.2, irreducibility is satisfied if p L p R = 1. Dutta (1995) provided somewhat weaker assumptions on the transition function that guarantee the state-independence property. But these assumptions are not necessary: the limit set of feasible payoffs is independent of the initial state as long as at least 1 of these probabilities is strictly less than 1, and the minmax payoff is always independent of the initial state.
To illustrate this folk theorem, let, for instance, p L = 1 − p R = 1/10 in Example 1, so that playing action L gives player i both his highest reward in that state and the highest probability of transiting to the other state in which his reward is for sure higher than in his own state. The folk theorem holds here. The set of PPE payoffs is then the convex hull of (1 1), (3/2 3/2), (55/28 1), and (1 55/28). See Figure 3. 
SHORT-RUN PLAYERS
It is trivial to extend the algorithm to the case in which some players are short-run. Following FL, suppose that players i = 1 L, L ≤ I, are long-run players whose objective is to maximize the average discounted sum of rewards, with discount factor δ < 1. Players j ∈ SR := {L + 1 I} are short-run players, each representative of which plays only once. For each state s ∈ S, let B(s) :
be the correspondence that maps any mixed action profile (α 1 α L ) for the long-run players to the corresponding static equilibria for the short-run players in state s. That is, for each α ∈ graph B(s), and each j > L, α j maximizes r j (s · α −j ). The characterization goes through if we "ignore" the short-run players and simply modify Constrain 1 by requiring that v be a Nash equilibrium payoff of the game Γ (s x) for the long-run players, achieved by some α s ∈ graph B(s) for each s.
An Example
We now provide an illustration of the algorithm that attempts to tread the thin line between accessibility and triviality. Consider the following game, loosely inspired by Dixit, Grossman, and Gul (2000) and Phelan (2006) . EXAMPLE 2: There are two parties. In any given period, one of the two parties is in power. Party i = 1 2 is in power in state i. Only the party in power and the households take actions. Households can produce (P) at cost c with value 1, or not produce (NP). There is a continuum of households and, therefore, we treat them as one short-run player. The government in power can either honor (H) or confiscate (C). Honoring means choosing a fixed tax rate τ and, therefore, getting revenues τμ i , where μ i is the fraction of households who produce in state i. By confiscating, the government appropriates all output. This gives rise to the payoff matrix given by Figure 4 .
It is assumed that 1 − τ > c > 0. Actions are not observed, but parties that honor are more likely to remain in power. More precisely, if the state is i and the realized action is H, the state remains i with probability p H ; if the action is C, it remains the same with probability p L , with 0 < p L < p H < 1.
Note that, given the households' preferences, the best-reply correspondence in state i is where α i is the probability that party i plays H. The feasible set F is independent of the initial state and is equal to the convex hull of the payoff vectors (0 0), ((1 − c)/2 (1 − c)/2), (v 0), and (0 v), wherē
These expressions are intuitive. Note that the highest symmetric payoff involves both parties confiscating as much as possible, subject to the constraint that the households are still willing to produce. The payoff from confiscating at this rate is 1 − c, and since time in power is equally spent between both parties, the resulting payoff is ((1 − c)/2 (1 − c)/2). Consider next the case in which one party always confiscates, so that households never produce in that state, while the other party confiscates at the highest rate consistent with all the households producing. The invariant distribution assigns probability
to that state and the asymmetric payoff follows. Finally, the minmax payoff of each party is zero, which is an equilibrium payoff.
Theorem 1 applies to this game. Let us compute the equilibrium payoff set as δ → 1. The optimization program with weights λ = (λ 1 λ 2 ) involves eight variables x i t (s), i = 1 2, s t = 1 2, satisfying the constraints
in addition to the requirement that α i be a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ (i x), i = 1 2.
Consider a vector λ > 0. Note that the constraints (10) must bind: Indeed, because player i does not make a choice in state −i, the Nash equilibrium requirements (i.e., Constraint 1 in program P(λ)) give us at most three constraints per player (his preference ordering in the state in which he takes an action and the fact that he gets the same payoff in the other state). In addition to the three constraints (10), this gives us nine constraints, and there are eight variables x i t (s). We can check that if one of the three constraints is slack, we can increase the payoff of a player by changing the values of x i t (s), while satisfying all binding constraints. Observe now that we must have μ i ∈ {0 1}, i = 1 2. Indeed, suppose that μ i ∈ (0 1) for some i, so that α i ≥ c/(1 − τ). Then we can increase μ i and decrease x i i (i) x i i (−i) so as to keep player i's payoff constant, while keeping him indifferent between both actions (which he must be since μ i ∈ (0 1)). Given these observations, this now becomes a standard problem that can be solved by enumeration. Note, however, that we do not need to consider the case α 1 > c/(1 − τ) α 2 > c/(1 − τ): if this were the case, we could decrease both of these probabilities in such a way as to maintain the relative time spent in each state the same, while increasing both players' payoffs in their own state (because μ i = 1 is feasible as long as α i ≥ c/(1 − τ)). It is not hard to guess that the optimal action profile for λ 1 = λ 2 > 0 is to set α i = c/(1 − τ), i = 1 2 (and, as mentioned, μ i = 1), and we obtain the highest feasible symmetric payoff. If we consider a coordinate direction, say λ 1 > 0 λ 2 = 0, it is intuitive that households will not produce in state 2, and party 2 will confiscate with sufficient probability for such behavior to be optimal, and party 1 will confiscate at the highest rate consistent with households producing. Party 1 must not be willing either to confiscate for sure (which increases his reward when he does) or to honor for sure (which increases the fraction of time spent in his state, when his reward is positive), and this means that his payoff cannot exceed
assuming this is positive. It follows that the limit equilibrium payoff set is given by H = {v ∈ F : 0 ≤ v i ≤ṽ ∀i = 1 2} ifṽ > 0, and the singleton payoff is (0 0) otherwise. Note that from the first argument definingṽ, the payoff set shrinks to (0 0) as p H → p L , as is to be expected: if confiscation cannot be statistically detected, households will prefer not to produce. See Figure 5 for an illustration in the case in whichṽ > (1 − c)/2.
A Characterization With Full Rank
The equilibrium payoff set obtained in Example 2 is reminiscent of the results of FL for repeated games with long-run and short-run players. We provide here an extension of their results to the case of stochastic games, but maintain full rank assumptions for long-run players.
One of the main insights of FL, which is an extension of Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin (1990) , is that achieving some payoffs may require the long-run players to randomize on the equilibrium path, so as to induce short-run players to take particular actions. This means that long-run player i must be indifferent between all actions in the support of his mixture, and so continuation payoffs must adjust so that his payoff cannot exceed the one he would achieve from the action in this support that yields him the lowest payoff.
For a direction λ = ±e i , the pairwise full rank condition ensures that the above requirement is not restrictive, that is, we only need to care about the feasibility given that short-run players take static best responses. However, for the coordinate directions λ = ±e i , since we cannot adjust long-run player i's continuation payoffs without affecting the score, the optimal mixed action of player i is determined by taking into account both the effect on the short-run players' actions and the cost of letting player i take that action.
The same applies here. We first deal with non-coordinate directions. To incorporate short-run players' incentives, we define F δ (s) as the convex hull of the set of long-run players' feasible payoffs of the game with initial state s and discount factor δ, where we require that the players play actions from graph B(t) whenever the current state is t. The set F(s) of long-run players' limit-average feasible payoffs is defined similarly. The set F δ (s) converges to F(s) as δ → 1.
ASSUMPTION F3: For each state s and pair (i j) of long-run players, every mixed action profile in graph B(s) has pairwise full rank for players i and j in state s.
Similarly to Lemma 2, we can make the following statements:
LEMMA 3: Under Assumption F3, we have the following conditions.
Theorem 1 applies here. Namely, if Assumption A is satisfied and H has nonempty interior, then E δ (s) converges to H as δ → 1 for every s ∈ S.
Lemma 3 leaves open how to determine k(±e i ). Under Assumption F3, since every mixed action profile has individual full rank, we can control each long-run player's continuation payoffs and induce him to play any action. This implies that, without loss of generality, in program P(±e i ), we can ignore the incentives of long-run players other than player i without affecting the score.
We can obtain a further simplification if Assumption F3 is strengthened to full monitoring. In this case, k(e i ) is equal to the value of the program Q 
ACTION-INDEPENDENT TRANSITIONS
Our characterization can be used to obtain qualitative insights. We here discuss the case in which the evolution of the state is independent of players' actions. To let the transition probabilities of the states vary, while keeping the distributions of signals fixed, we assume that the transition probabilities can be written as a product q(t|s) × π(y|s a). In other words, and in any period, the next state t and the public signal y are drawn independently, and the action profile only affects the distribution of y.
In this setup, it is intuitively clear that the (limit) set of PPE payoffs should only depend on q through its invariant measure, μ. If the signal structure is rich enough and the folk theorem holds, this is straightforward. Indeed, the (limit) set of feasible payoffs is equal to the convex hull of { s∈S μ(s)r(s a) : a ∈ A} and a similar formula holds for the (limit) minmax.
We prove below that this observation remains valid even when the folk theorem fails to hold. The proof is based on our characterization, and providing a direct proof of this fact does not seem to be an easy task.
In this subsection, we fix a signal structure π : S × A → Δ(Y ) and consider two transition functions, denoted q and (with an abuse of notation) p. To stress the dependence of the analysis on the transition function and given a (unit) direction λ ∈ S 1 , we denote by P q (λ) the optimization program P(λ) when the transition probability over states is set to q : S → Δ(S). We also denote by k q (λ) the value of P q (λ) and denote by H(q) the intersection of all half-spaces {v ∈ R I : λ · v ≤ k q (λ)} obtained by letting λ vary.
PROPOSITION 3: Let p and q be two irreducible transition functions over S, with the same invariant measure μ. Then H(p) = H(q).
This implies that for the purpose of studying the limit equilibrium payoff set in the case of transitions that are action-independent, we might as well assume that the state is drawn (i.i.d.) across periods.
14 In that case, the stochastic game can be viewed as a repeated game in which player i's actions in each period are maps from S to A i . The program P(λ α) can then be shown to be equivalent to the corresponding program of FL. One direction is a simple change of variable; the other direction relies on Lemma 1.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This paper shows that recursive methods developed for the study of repeated games can be generalized to stochastic games and can be applied to obtain qualitative insights as δ → 1.
This, of course, leaves many questions unanswered. First, as mentioned, the results derived here rely on δ → 1. While not much is known in the general case for repeated games either, there still are a few results available in the literature (on the impact of the quality of information, for instance). It is then natural to ask whether those results can be extended to stochastic games.
Within the realm of asymptotic analysis, it also appears important to generalize our results to broader settings. The characterizations of the equilibrium payoff set and the folk theorem established in this paper rely on some strong assumptions. The set of actions, signals, and states are all assumed to be finite. We suspect that the characterization can be generalized to the case of 14 One direction is intuitive: when transitions are action-independent, we can construct equilibria in which play in periods 1 k + 1 2k + 1 proceeds independently from play in periods 2 k + 2 2k + 2 and so on. Hence, the equilibrium payoff set with transition q and discount δ "contains" the equilibrium payoff set with transition q k and discount δ k (note, however, that we are not comparing sets for a common initial state). Hence, taking δ to 1 faster than we take k to infinity makes it plausible that the limit payoff set in the i.i.d. case is included in the limit set given q.
richer action and signal sets, but extending the result to richer state spaces raises significant challenges. Yet this is perhaps the most important extension: even with finitely many states, beliefs about those states affect the players' incentives when states are no longer common knowledge, as is often the case in applications in which players have private information, and these beliefs must therefore be treated as state variables themselves.
Finally, there is an alternative possible asymptotic analysis that is of significant interest. As is the case with public signals (see the concluding remarks of FLM), an important caveat is in order regarding the interpretation of our limit results. It is misleading to think of δ → 1 as periods growing shorter, as transitions are kept fixed throughout the analysis. If transitions are determined by physical constraints, then these probabilities should be adjusted as periods grow shorter. As a result, feasible payoffs will not be independent of the initial state. It remains to be seen whether such an analysis is equally tractable.
APPENDIX: PROOFS
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1 Let δ < 1 be given. To show the first statement, for each state s, choose an equilibrium payoff v s that maximizes the inner product λ · w for w ∈ E δ (s). Consider a PPE σ with payoffs (v s ). For each initial state s, let α s = σ(s) be the mixed moves played in stage 1 and let w t (s y) be the continuation payoffs following y, if in state t at stage 2. Note that λ · w t (s y) ≤ λ · v t for y ∈ Y and s t ∈ S. By construction, for each s ∈ S, α s is a Nash equilibrium, with payoff v s , of the game with payoff function (w t (s y) − v s ) Observe that α s is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ (s x), with payoff v s . Next, lets be a state that minimizes λ · v s and letx t (s y) := x t (s y) + vs − v s for each s t ∈ S, y ∈ Y . Then α s is a Nash equilibrium of Γ (s x), with payoff vs. On the other hand, for each T φ ψ, we have
The second statement follows immediately from the first statement.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2
Since Z is a compact set contained in the interior of H, there exists η > 0 such that
is also a compact set contained in the interior of H. Z η is a "smooth approximation" of Z such that the curvature of the boundary of Z η is at most 1/η. We start with a technical statement. We say that (v x) is feasible in P(λ) if (v x α) is feasible in P(λ) for some α.
LEMMA 4: There are ε 0 > 0 and a bounded set K ⊂ R I × R S×Y ×S×I of (v x) such that the following statement holds. For every z ∈ Z η and λ ∈ S 1 , there exists
PROOF: Given z ∈ Z η and since Z η is contained in the interior of H, we have λ · z < k(λ) for every λ ∈ S 1 . Therefore, there exists a feasible pair (v x) in P(λ) such that λ · z < λ · v. The conclusion of the lemma states that (v x) can be chosen within a bounded set, independently of λ and of z.
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Chooseε > 0 such that λ · z +ε < λ · v and definẽ x t (s y) = x t (s y) −ελ ṽ = v −ελ for each s t ∈ S and y ∈ Y . Observe that for each s ∈ S, v is an equilibrium payoff of the game Γ (s x). Note in addition that s∈T λ ·x φ(s) (s ψ(s)) ≤ −ε|T | < 0 for each T φ, and ψ. Therefore, for everyz close enough to z, for everyλ close enough to λ, the pair (ṽ x) is feasible in P(λ) andλ ·z <λ ·ṽ. The result then follows, by compactness of Z η and of S 1 .
Q.E.D.
In the sequel, we let κ 0 > 0 be such that x ≤ κ 0 and z − v ≤ κ 0 for every (v x) ∈ K and z ∈ Z η . Choose n ∈ N such that ε 0 (n − 1)/2 > 2κ 0 |S|. Set ε := ε 0 n − 1 2 − 2κ 0 |S| > 0 Next, chooseδ < 1 to be large enough so that (n/2) 2 (1−δ) ≤ |S| and 1−δ n−1 ≥ (n − 1)(1 − δ)/2 for every δ ≥δ. Finally, set κ := 2(n − 1) δ n−1 κ 0 Given a map w : H n → R I which associates a payoff vector, to any history of length n, we denote by Γ n (s w; δ) the δ-discounted, (n − 1)-stage game with final payoffs w and initial state s.
The following proposition is essential for the proof of Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 4: For every direction λ ∈ S 1 , every z ∈ Z η , and every discount factor δ ≥δ, there exist continuation payoffs w : H n → R I such that the following conditions hold:
C1. For each s, z is a PPE payoff of the game Γ n (s w; δ).
PROOF: Let λ, z, and δ be given as stated. Pick a feasible point
Given s t ∈ S and y ∈ Y , set
For each history h of length not exceeding n, we define w(h) by induction on the length of h. The definition of w follows FL. If h = (s 1 ), we set w(h) = z. For k ≥ 1 and h k+1 ∈ H k+1 , we set
where h k is the restriction of h k+1 to the first k stages.
Let k ≥ 1 and h k ∈ H k . As in FL, using (A.11), α s k is a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game with payoff function
(1 − δ)r(s k a) + δ t∈S y∈Y p(t y|s k a)w(h k y t) with payoff w(h k ). By the one-shot deviation principle, it follows that the Markov strategy profile α is a PPE of the game Γ n (s 1 w; δ), with payoff z (for each initial state s 1 ). This proves C1.
We now turn to C2. Let h n ∈ H n be given and let h k (k ≤ n) denote the restriction of h n to the first k stages. Observe that
for any k ≤ n − 1. Therefore,
and we get
This proves C2. We finally prove that C3 holds as well. The proof makes use of the following lemma. , and
. If m is odd, the sum is maximized by setting
, and x k = −1 for k > m+1 2
. In both cases, the sum is at most 1−2δ m/2 +δ m 1−δ .
as claimed.
Let¯δ < 1 be large enough so that (1−¯δ)κ ≤ η and (1−¯δ)κ 2 ≤ 2εη. The next lemma follows since the curvature of Z η is uniformly bounded from above.
LEMMA 6: For every z ∈ Z η and every δ ≥¯δ, there exists a direction λ ∈ S 1 such that if w ∈ R I satisfies w − z ≤ (1 − δ)κ and λ · w ≤ λ · z − (1 − δ)ε, then we have w ∈ Z η . PROOF: By the definition of Z η , for each z ∈ Z η , there exists z 0 ∈ Z such that z − z 0 ≤ η. Let λ := (z − z 0 )/ z − z 0 . (If z 0 = z, then take any unit vector.) Then, for any w, we have
The last expression is a quadratic form, which is maximized when z − z 0 = 0 or z − z 0 = η. Therefore,
We here prove Proposition 2. Fix any δ ≥ max{δ ¯δ }. For any z ∈ Z η , we construct a public strategy σ : H → × i Δ(A i ) and continuation payoffs w : H → Z η inductively as follows. Set w(h) = z ∈ Z η for any h = (s 1 ) ∈ H 1 . For k ≥ 1 and h ∈ H (n−1)(k−1)+1 , given that w(h) ∈ Z η , by Proposition 4, there exist continuation payoffs w h : H n → R I that satisfy C1 (that is, there exists a PPE of Γ n (s (n−1)(k−1)+1 w h ; δ), with payoff w(h)), C2, and C3. Let σ prescribe the PPE of Γ n (s (n−1)(k−1)+1 w h ; δ) for the block of periods between (n − 1)(k − 1) + 1 and (n − 1)k. For anyh ∈ H (n−1)k+1 whose restriction to the first (n − 1)(k − 1) + 1 periods is equal to h, let w(h) = w h ( nh ), where nh is the restriction ofh to the last n periods. It follows from C2, C3, and Lemma 6 that w(h) ∈ Z η . By the one-shot deviation principle and C1, for any initial state s, the constructed strategy σ is a PPE of the whole (infinite-horizon) game, with payoff z. Thus Z ⊂ Z η ⊆ E δ (s) for any s ∈ S.
A.3. Proof of Lemma 2
We prove the two statements in turn. We start with the first one and consider the two cases λ = ±e i for any i and λ = e i . Suppose that λ = ±e i for any i. Let δ < 1 be given. Then there exists a pure Markov strategy profile (a s ) ∈ A S with payoff (v s ) such that for each state s, v s maximizes the inner product λ · w for w ∈ F δ (s). By construction, for each s ∈ S, v s = (1 − δ)r(s a s ) + δ t p(t × Y |s a s )v t . Fix ε > 0 arbitrarily. By Assumption F2 and Lemma 6.2 of FLM, there exists an open and dense set of action profiles, each of which has pairwise full rank for all pairs of players. Therefore, for each s ∈ S, there existv s ,α s , andŵ t (s) such that λ ·ŵ t (s) ≤ λ ·v t for t ∈ S,v s = (1 − δ)r(s α s ) + δ t p(t × Y |s α s )ŵ t (s), λ ·v s ≥ λ · v s − ε, andα s has pairwise full rank for all pairs of players in state s.
Similarly to the proof of Proposition 1, lets be a state that minimizes λ ·v s . Setx t (s) := for each T ⊆ S, for each permutation φ : T → T . For each s ∈ S, althoughα s may not be a Nash equilibrium of Γ (s x), sinceα s satisfies pairwise full rank, there existsx t (s y) for y ∈ Y and t ∈ S such thatα s is a Nash equilibrium of Γ (s x +x) with payoffvs, and such that λ ·x t (s y) = 0 for each y ∈ Y and t ∈ S. With x t (s y) :=x t (s) +x t (s y), we have Then we have vs = r(s a s ) + t p(t × Y |s a s )x t (s) for each s ∈ S without affecting player i's incentives. For each s ∈ S, although players other than i may not maximize their payoffs in Γ (s x), by Assumption F1, there existsx t (s y) for y ∈ Y and t ∈ S such that a s is a Nash equilibrium of Γ (s x +x) with payoff vs, and such thatx i t (s y) = 0 for each y ∈ Y and t ∈ S. Thus we have k(e i ) ≥ sup δ<1 min s∈S max w∈F δ (s) w i ≥ min s∈S max w∈F(s) w i . The other direction of inequality is similar to that in the previous case. This concludes the proof of the first statement.
Last, consider λ = −e i for some i. Let δ < 1 be given. Then there exists a minmaxing Markov strategy profile (a This concludes the proof of the second statement.
A.4. Proof for the Characterization With Full Monitoring
We first show that P(e i ) and Q i + are equivalent. Take any (v x α) that is feasible in P(e i ). We have 
A.5. Proof of Proposition 3
We let a unit direction λ ∈ S 1 and a Markov strategy profile α = (α s ) be given. Consider programs P p (λ α) and P q (λ α) with fixed α. We prove that for each feasible pair (v x) in P p (λ α), there is z : S × Y → R S×I such that (v z) is a feasible pair in P q (λ α). This implies the result. The proof uses the following two observations. Denote by P (resp. Q) the S × S matrix whose (s t)th entry is p(t|s) (resp. q(t|s)).
CLAIM 2: The ranges of the two linear maps (with matrices) Id − P and Id − Q are equal.
PROOF: Assume that q is aperiodic. Let there be given a vector ξ ∈ R S in the range of Id − P. Hence, there is ψ ∈ R S such that ξ = ψ − Pψ. Hence, μ ξ = 0. Since q is an irreducible transition function with invariant measure μ, the vector Q n ξ converges as n → ∞ to the constant vector, whose components are all equal to μ ξ = 0. Moreover, the convergence takes place at an exponential speed. Therefore, the vectorψ := +∞ n=0 Q n ξ is well defined and solvesψ = ξ + Qψ. This proves the result.
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Q.E.D. 16 The proof in the case where q is periodic is similar. As in the aperiodic case, the infinite sum inψ is well defined.
